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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews theories about the economic effects of land value 
taxation as well as research which suggests hypotheses addressing the 
disparate circumstances of central cities such as Pittsburgh, suburban cities 
such as McKeesport, and relatively isolated cities such as New Castle. 
In order to test those hypotheses, specified a general econometric model of 
the housing market is specified. The model is adjusted to fit the 
circumstances of each city, and then the adjusted models using time-series 
data for each city is estimated. The periods of study for each city cover 
spans of time during which there were both increases in the tax rates 
applicable to land and decreases in the tax rates applicable to improvements. 
Incentive effects of decreases in the tax rate on buildings are expected to 
encourage housing development in Pittsburgh and, possibly, New Castle, 
but not in McKeesport. Liquidity effects of increases in the tax rate on land 
may encourage housing development in the three cities. 
All three cities employ land value taxation as an economic development tool 
and as a means for helping to stem or reverse the loss of population. By 
encouraging the construction of housing, land value taxation may help to 
attract households that would otherwise locate in other jurisdictions. 
Although Pittsburgh has had land value taxation since 1913 (Williams 
1962), McKeesport and New Castle did not adopt such a tax system until 
1979and1982, respectively. 
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LAND VALUE TAXATION AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 
FOR THREE CITIES IN PENNSYLVANIAl 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Steven C. Bourassa 
Urban Research Unit 
This paper summarises and revises my previously published research 
on land value taxation2 and housing development in Pittsburgh, 
McKeesport, and New Castle, Pennsylvania (Bourassa 1987; in press).3 In 
this paper, I review theories about the economic effects of land value 
taxation as well as research which suggests hypotheses addressing the 
disparate circumstances of central cities such as Pittsburgh, suburban cities 
such as McKeesport, and relatively isolated cities such as New Castle. 
In order to test those hypotheses, I specified a general econometric 
model of the housing market, adjusted the model to fit the circumstances of 
each city, and then estimated the adjusted models using time-series data for 
each city. The periods of study for each city cover spans of time during 
which there were both increases in the tax rates applicable to land and 
decreases in the tax rates applicable to improvements. Incentive effects of 
decreases in the tax rate on buildings are expected to encourage housing 
development in Pittsburgh and, possibly, New Castle, but not in 
1 This paper was presented in the Department of Economics Seminar Series, Research 
School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, 26 May 1989. It has 
benefitted from discussion with Max Neutze as well as members of the Department of 
Economics. 
2 Land value taxation generally refers to the taxation of land at rates higher thaq those 
applied to buildings and other improvements. Most local jurisdictions in the United States 
apply the same rates to both land and improvements. 
3 The primary substantive change between this and the previous papers is in the 
discussion of liquidity effects of taxes on land and consequent expectations about the 
behavior of land tax variables. 
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McKeesport. Liquidity effects of increases in the tax rate on land may 
encourage housing development in the three cities. 
All three cities employ land value taxation as an economic development 
tool and as a means for helping to stem or reverse the loss of population. By 
encouraging the construction of housing, land value taxation may help to 
attract households that would otherwise locate in other jurisdictions. 
Although Pittsburgh has had land value taxation since 1913 (Williams 
1962), McKeesport and New Castle did not adopt such a tax system until 
1979 and 1982, respectively. 
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
Writing in the mid-1960s, Heilbrun (1966) noted that he was unable to 
find any conclusive evidence of the effects of land value taxation on urban 
housing markets. Since the mid-1960s, several researchers have completed 
econometric studies of the effects of real estate tax rates on the supply of 
housing services or, more generally, structural services.4 Tanzer's (1985) 
cross-sectional study of 91 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the 
United States concluded that a given per cent reduction in the tax rate on 
structures results in equal per cent increases in housing quality and quantity. 
Pollock and Shoup's (1977) study of the tourist hotel district in Waikiki, 
Hawaii, suggested that elimination of the tax on structures would result in a 
significant increase in the amount of investment in hotels. Grieson's (1974) 
general equilibrium study reached a similar conclusion with respect to the 
supply of structures, in general, using aggregate data for the United States. 
None of these studies explicitly addressed the possible effects of increases in 
the land portion of the real estate tax. 
In contrast, a few researchers have examined the effects of land taxes. 
Mathis and Zech (1982) undertook a cross-sectional analysis of 27 cities in 
Pennsylvania and found no evidence that those cities with land value tax 
4 The term structural services is used because it allows for a common, albeit abstract, 
unit of measurement which takes into account all qualitative and quantitative aspects of 
structures. Compare Olsen's (1969) use of the term housing services. 
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schemes experienced more development than those with standard real estate 
taxes. Mathis and Zech's analysis was marred, however, by their 
misspecification of the tax variable as the ratio of the improvement and land 
tax rates.5 Pollakowski's (1982) study of the liquidity effects of the land 
portion of Pittsburgh's real estate tax found a statistically significant 
relationship between land tax payments and the probability of transfer of a 
property. Pollakowski was unable to determine whether properties were 
improved after transfer, however. Writing about the same time as 
Heilbrun, Richman (1965, p. 260) commented: "Whether or not the 
Pittsburgh graded tax has proved to be beneficial to the city is difficult to 
establish". This is still true today because the negative results obtained by 
Mathis and Zech may be attributable to the methods employed by those 
researchers and Pollakowski's results are inconclusive. 
III. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC THEORY 
Economic theory suggests that shifting the tax burden from 
improvements to land may encourage development in two ways. These are 
the liquidity and incentive effects. Increases in the land tax rate may result 
in a liquidity effect, while decreases in the improvement tax rate should 
result in an incentive effect in central cities and possibly in isolated cities, 
but not in suburban jurisdictions. 
The Liquidity Effect 
The literature on the economic effects of land value taxation suggests 
that the liquidity effect has two complementary components. One 
component is the effect on current landowners, who must bear increased 
holding costs and who are thereby encouraged to improve their properties 
or sell to someone who will. Netzer (1966, p. 33) explains this as follows: 
It is generally agreed that taxes on the value of bare land-the· 
sites themselves exclusive of applications of reproducible capital 
5 The relationship between that ratio and the level of development is theoretically 
ambiguous. See Coffin and Nelson's (1983) apt critique of Mathis and Zech's methods. 
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in the form of grading, fertilizer, and the like--rest on the 
owners of the sites at the time the tax is initially levied or 
increased. The tax cannot be shifted because shifting is possible, 
under reasonably competitive conditions, only if the supply of 
sites is reduced. But the supply of land is, for all practical 
purposes, perfectly inelastic. Individual landowners will not 
respond to an increase in land taxes by withdrawing their sites 
from the market, since doing so will not affect their tax liability. 
Indeed, their only chance of reducing the burdensomeness of the 
tax relative to their income streams is to seek to raise the latter by 
encouraging more intensive use of the sites they own. 
Collectively, landowners cannot reduce the stock of land: If 
individual landowners wish to liquidate in the face of higher 
taxes, they must sell the sites to other owners. 
This does not, of course, imply that additional development will actually 
take place. The actual extent of the holding cost effect would seem to 
depend on the existence of land which could be developed profitably but is 
being withheld from development for non-financial reasons, such as the 
direct utility of landownership (see Neutze 1987). In this case, increased 
land taxes would have to more than offset the direct utilities preventing 
landowners from supplying land for development. 
Following Bentick's (1979) analysis, it might be thought that another 
type of holding cost effect might occur. This would involve land being held 
for a future development project that would provide a stream of land rents 
with a higher present value than that of an alternative project which could 
be developed immediately. In this case, the effect of the higher land tax may 
be to give the stream of land rents from the immediately developable 
project the higher present value. In regard to this possibility, Bentick 
compares two hypothetical projects, one of which could be developed 
immediately, while the other could be developed profitably only at some 
point in the future. Bentick assumes that (p. 861) "project 1 uses specialized 
and fixed buildings which cannot be used in project 2 or elsewhere and ... 
the time of commencement of project 2 is too short to allow these structures 
to be amortized". The first project yields one dollar of land rent per year in 
perpetuity and has a present value, P 1, of 1/r, where r is an appropriate 
discount rate. The other project yields c dollars per year after a period, t. 
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The present value of the second project, P2, is e-rtc/r. The delayed project 
will be preferred if e-rtc/r > l/r. In this case the critical value of t is: 
t' = (In c)/r 
and the second project will be preferred only if t < t'. If a tax on land value, 
b, is introduced, then for the second project to be preferred, the following 
must be true: 
e-(r + b)tc/(r + b) > l/(r + b). 
In this case, the critical value oft is: 
t" = (In c)/(r + b) 
and now the second project will be preferred only if t < t". It is clear that t" 
< t' and, therefore, that the second project is less likely to be preferred after 
the tax than before. 
A fatal problem with Bentick's analysis is his confusion regarding the 
normal base for taxes on land.6 This is usually defined as land value, or the 
value of a site as if it had no improvements. Land value and rent are not a 
function of the current use of land, but instead are a function of the so-called 
"highest and best use" of a site. Highest and best use for a given site is a 
function of uses on surrounding sites and is the use to which the site would 
be put if it were bare. As Gaffney (1969) puts it, land rent is best defined as 
(p. 141): "the highest latent opportunity cost of land". Land rent does not 
change because the use of a site has changed. In other words, at any given 
time, land value is constant and does not change as one considers different 
potential uses for a site. Thus Bentick is incorrect in speaking of the land 
value or rent of a particular site as if it were a function of the use of that 
site;7 consequently, his analysis collapses. Since the value of a site is 
independent of the use of that site, a tax on land value will not have the 
6 I am grateful to Max Neutze for pointing this out. 
7 Douglas (1980) makes this same error. 
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impact on the timing of development claimed by Bentick (Tideman 1982).8 
Given the flaw in analyses such as Bentick's, one would have to conclude 
that the only circumstance in which the holding cost effect might be 
significant would involve land withheld from development for non-
financial reasons. 
The other component of the liquidity effect is simply the obverse of 
increased holding costs. This obverse component is due to capitalisation of 
the tax. The relationship between the tax rate, b, and the capitalised market 
value of the land, L, is: 
L=E/(r+ b) 
where E is the economic rent of the land (before any tax) and r is the 
discount rate (Becker 1969).9 It is clear that, as b approaches infinity, L 
approaches zero. Capitalisation of the land tax makes it easier for potential 
developers to acquire land and could thereby encourage development. 
Becker (1969, p. 25) observes: "The benefit would be the equivalent of an 
automatic perpetual loan to the developer for purposes of land acquisition in 
the amount of the capitalised value of the land tax". This, of course, 
assumes that imperfect capital markets are preventing developers from 
obtaining sufficient capital for land purchases for otherwise viable 
development projects. This is largely an empirical question. 
8 For an example of the traditional analysis which shows that land taxes do not have an 
effect on the timing of development, see Neutze (l 969). 
9 This must be qualified in view of Feldstein's assertion that the tax on land is not fully 
capitalised. He writes (1977, pp. 350-351): 
The essential oversight of the classical analysis is to ignore the fact that land and 
produced capital are alternative components of individual life-cycle wealth. Each 
generation wishes to accumulate a certain level of wealth with which to finance 
retirement in old age. If the tax on pure land rent reduces the value of land, a 
larger amount of the desired wealth must be accumulated in the fonn of produced 
capital. The tax on rental income thus induces an increase in the equilibrium 
capital stock and therefore in the equilibrium ratio of capital to land. This raises 
the marginal productivity of land and reduces the rate of interest at which net land 
rents are capitalized. Part of the tax on pure rent is thus shifted in the form of a 
lower net yield on capital and a higher wage rate. Moreover, the price of land 
does not fall as much as the traditional theory predicts. 
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The Incentive Effect 
The incentive effect of decreasing the tax rate on improvements is due 
simply to the reduction in the excise effects of the improvements tax. The 
tax on improvements is in part an excise tax which reduces the quantity of 
improvements produced. Mieszkowski (1972) has argued that the system of 
local property taxes in the United States has both global and excise effects.IO 
The global effect is a reduction in the real rate of return to capital by the 
average property tax rate. More important for my purposes is the excise 
effect, which depends on geographical variations in tax rates, with low tax 
communities having a lower cost of capital than high tax jurisdictions. 
Given the assumption of highly mobile capital, it is reasonable to expect that 
changes in tax rates will result in flows of capital from jurisdictions with 
high rates to those with low rates. With regard to housing, Mieszkowski 
observes (pp. 78-79): "After the imposition of taxes, residents of high tax 
communities will decrease their demand for residential capital and some 
households will shift their residential capital to low tax areas". 
Mieszkowski's analysis employs a number of simplifications, one of 
which is particularly worthy of mention here. His analysis for the most part 
ignores the fact that varying levels of public goods and services are 
provided in different communities with their differing tax bases and rates. 
As he notes (p. 75): 
Throughout most of the analysis we shall abstract from the effects 
of the expenditure side of the budget. The only justification of 
this simplification is convenience, as the level and quality of 
public expenditures influence housing values and locational 
decisions. 
It is important to consider the effects of public expenditures because the 
obvious benefits of a reduction in the improvement tax rate could be offset 
to some degree by the adverse impact of a decrease in provision of public 
goods and services. 
10 Mieszkowski uses the term property tax to refer to taxes on reproducible capital; he 
does not consider the effects of taxes on land. 
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The effects of expenditures could be neglected if real revenues (and 
expenditures) remained constant while the tax burden was shifted from 
improvements to land. That hypothetical situation is unlikely, however, as 
municipal revenue needs tend to be increasing. In the case of Pittsburgh, 
for example, the improvement tax rate has remained relatively constant in 
recent years while the land tax rate has increased substantially. Presumably, 
real estate tax revenues have been increasing in Pittsburgh along with 
overall revenues and expenditures. While it would be easy to obtain 
statistics on expenditures, it would be patently difficult to reach any useful 
conclusions about changes in the levels of public goods and services 
provided in a city and the effects of those changes on real estate investment. 
Because the effects of changes in public expenditures are so difficult to 
account for and probably vary considerably over time and among places, it 
is prudent to conclude that the results presented here are likely to be rather 
time- and place-specific. 
Another important consideration is the possibility of migration of 
capital among various sectors due to differences in effective tax rates. 
Mieszkowski gives the following example (p. 81): 
[C]apital is mobile between industry and residential real estate 
and the possibility of tax differentials between broad industry 
groups must be accounted for. Housing services, in the 
aggregate, may be taxed more heavily than industrial capital or 
vice-versa. 
Although different types of real property are assessed ostensibly at the same 
rates in Pittsburgh, McKeesport, and New Castle, hidden biases may exist. 
If so reductions in the improvement tax rate would affect the various classes 
of property in a nonuniform manner and capital may migrate among the 
classes. It is also likely that different classes of land use would be affected in 
different ways by changes in land or improvement tax rates because some 
uses are land-intensive while others are capital-intensive. As in the case of 
public expenditures, geographical and temporal variations in assessment 
practices or land use characteristics make it difficult to generalise from 
results such as those presented here. 
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Incentive Effects in Different Types of Jurisdictions 
Elaborating on Tiebout's (19S6) well-known hypothesis, Hamilton 
( 197 Sb) concluded that property taxes in suburban jurisdictions act as 
benefit taxes rather than excise taxes. Tiebout posited that consumers' 
preferences for local public services are satisfied by migration among 
communities, given a fairly large number of communities providing varied 
sets of services in a metropolitan area. Hamilton observed that Tiebout's 
model failed to adequately address the matter of prices for local public 
services. As Hamilton (197Sb, p. 20S) notes: "[T]he Tiebout Hypothesis 
seems to be a formula for musical suburbs, with the poor following the rich 
in a never-ending quest for a tax base." 
Hamilton argues that property taxes act as the efficient prices for 
public services. In Hamilton's model, proportional property taxes are the 
only source of local revenue, and zoning mandates a minimum level of 
housing consumption per family in each jurisdiction. Given a choice of 
jurisdictions with varying levels of public expenditures and zoning 
requirements, a household moves to the community that best satisfies its 
needs for housing and local public services. In this model, the property tax 
rate is proportional to the level of public services provided and the tax is, in 
effect, the price of those services. All households in a jurisdiction consume 
the same amount of housing-the minimum required amount-because they 
would not be maximising their levels of utility by consuming more than the 
minimum. If a household wants to consume more housing, it will maximise 
its utility by moving to a jurisdiction which requires exactly the amount of 
housing consumption desired. This is because such a move will reduce the 
household's tax bill relative to the amount of public services consumed. 
This mechanism does not, however, work in central cities because such 
cities are heterogeneous-i.e., they cannot mandate city-wide minimum 
levels of housing consumption (Hamilton 197 Sa). According to Hamilton 
(197Sa, p. 14): 
[T] he property tax in the central city does inhibit housing 
consumption in exactly the manner that an excise tax on any 
commodity inhibits its consumption. This leads to the prediction 
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that the property tax will depress central-city residential property 
consumption relative to suburban consumption. 
Hamilton's analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions and 
it is clear that the suburban property tax is not a completely efficient 
benefits tax. Nevertheless, Hamilton (1975a) has provided some empirical 
evidence that clearly supports his theoretical conclusions. More recently, 
Ihlitnfeldt (1984) has reported additional empirical results in support of 
Hamilton's thesis. Both Hamilton and Ihlanfeldt show that, in metropolitan 
areas with a large number of suburban jurisdictions, housing consumption 
is ceteris paribus less in central cities than in their suburbs by the amount 
one would expect if there were an excise effect in the former but not the 
latter. Thus it seems that Hamilton's model may be a reasonably good 
approximation of reality. 
To the extent that Hamilton's model is correct, one would not expect 
decreases in the improvement tax rate to have an incentive effect in 
suburban jurisdictions such as McKeesport, which is one of a large number 
of suburbs in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. In the simple case in which 
a shift to land value taxation does not involve a change in revenues or 
expenditures, the suburban household's tax bill will be unchanged by the 
shift. Households will continue to maximise their utilities by consuming the 
minimum required amount of housing specified by the zoning in their 
chosen jurisdictions and, therefore, the amount of housing will not increase 
due to reductions in the tax rate applied to structures.I I 
Consider, for example, the case of an incoming household deciding 
whether to settle in community X or community Y. To simplify this 
analysis, assume that both communities provide the same level of public 
services and both have the same zoning restrictions. Community X has land 
value taxation while Y does not. Presumably, the household has decided to 
live in X or Y because the zoning in those two communities requires a 
minimum level of housing consumption which matches the amount that the 
11 There remains, however, the possibility that a shift to heavier taxes on land will have 
a liquidity effect. If housing lots are being withheld from development for non-financial 
reasons, a shift to a heavier tax on land may motivate the owners of those lots to release 
them for development. 
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household wishes to consume. Clearly, the household has no incentive to 
chose X over Y because its tax bill will be identical in both places. 
In contrast to McKeesport, in a heterogeneous central city such as 
Pittsburgh one would expect an incentive effect. As for the case of New 
Castle, which is a relatively isolated city, one would expect the incentive 
effect to be less significant than in Pittsburgh, or possibly insignificant, 
because it is more difficult for households to adjust their locations between 
urban areas than within an urban area. 
IV. THE MODEL, DATA, AND EXPECTATIONS 
The General Model 
The general model of the urban housing market contains elements of 
both supply and demand. I assume that there is a log-linear relationship 
between quantity and the various elements of demand and supply. The 
logarithm of the demand function is: 
where: 
Qd = quantity of housing demanded; 
Rn= the average rent for new housing services; 
Re= the average rent for existing housing services; 
Y = average household income; 
N = the number of households; 
P x = the prices of other goods and services; and 
o:o. 0:1 • ... , o:5 are the parameters of the equation. 
The logarithm of the supply function is: 
In Qs = 0:6 + 0:7 In Rn+ o:s In P 0 + 0:9 In Pm + a: JO In r 
+ a: 11 In b + a: 12 In z 
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where: 
Qs = quantity of housing supplied; 
Rn= the average rent for new housing services; 
P 0 = the price of operating inputs; 
Pm= the price of maintenance inputs; 
r = the cost of housing capital; 
b = the effective land tax rate; 
z = the effective improvement tax rate; and 
cx:6, cx:7, .•• , cx:12 are the parameters of the equation. 
The relevant reduced form equation is: 
where: 
Q = Qd=Qs; 
the variables are defined as before; and 
Po. Pb ... , P9 are the parameters. 
One immediately obvious problem is that Re is not exogenous-It IS 
dependent on Qd. The solution to this problem is to use a lagged value of Re 
in estimation. Another problem is that N may be dependent on the tax rates; 
however, it will be assumed that the proxy for N and Y, resident 
employment, is exogenous.12 On the supply side, it is assumed that 
operating and maintenance inputs are in perfectly elastic supply so that their 
prices are exogenously determined. 
12 While this may not be true in the long run (i.e., a shift to land value taxation could 
result in industrial and commercial development and greater employment), it is probably 
true in the short run. The model specified here obviously captures only short-run effects 
of the tax rates. 
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The Data and Adjustments to the Model 
The periods of study were 1978-1984 for Pittsburgh, 1978-1986 for 
McKeesport, and 1979-1986 for New Castle.13 In view of the small 
number of years in each study period and the relatively large number of 
parameters to be estimated, monthly data were used. Virtually the only 
available monthly measure of new housing development is the dollar value 
of building permit applications.14 It is assumed that there is a reasonably 
uniform relationship between the values given on building permit 
applications and the actual costs of construction. Even though permits may 
substantially underestimate or overestimate costs, if they do so uniformly, 
there will be no distortion in the results. With respect to the McKeesport 
and New Castle data, it was in some cases difficult to determine whether a 
given permit was issued for residential or for other types of construction. 
This ambiguity in the data may have affected the results somewhat. 
The available data and the peculiar circumstances of each city 
necessitated adjustments to the basic model. In the case of Pittsburgh, the 
building permit data used for the dependent variable contained dollar values 
for housing construction in new buildings but excluded dollar values for 
housing rehabilitation projects. This made it necessary to add a variable, G, 
to capture the effects of federal income tax incentives for rehabilitation 
which may have affected the flow of capital into housing in new relative to 
existing buildings.15 In addition, extensive mortgage subsidy programs in 
13 The period of study for Pittsburgh reflects the timing of significant tax rate changes 
which took place after the adoption of a home rule charter in 1976. Prior to home rule, 
Pennsylvania law required Pittsburgh to tax land at exactly twice the rate applied to 
improvements. 
14 Building permit data were obtained from the Bureau of Building Inspection, 
Department of Public Safety, City of Pittsburgh, and the Building Inspectors for 
McKeesport and New Castle. Public housing projects, which would not be affected by 
tax rates, were deleted from the data and the building permit series were smoothed in 
order to eliminate seasonal and irregular fluctuations. The building permit data were 
deflated using Boeckh's Building Cost Index Numbers, provided courtesy of American 
Appraisal Associates, Milwaukee, Wisc. 
15 Data were obtained from the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. The 
data consisted of the dollar value of residential rehabilitation projects for which application 
was made to take advantage of federal income tax credits. The expected project 
commencement date was used to assign projects to specific months. The monthly values 
were deflated and smoothed. 
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Pittsburgh suggested a need to add a variable, s, measuring the dollar value 
of mortgage subsidies.16 The cost of housing capital variable, r, is defined 
as the difference between the nominal home mortgage rate and an 
appropriate risk-free rate, in this case the nominal three-year Treasury Bill 
rate.17 As the difference between the nominal rates is the same as the 
difference between the real rates, there is no need to adjust for inflation. I 
will call this difference the 'real spread'. In all three cities, resident 
employment data were used as a convenient proxy, M, for the combined 
effects of average household income and number of households.18 These 
data include the number of workers residing in each city regardless of place 
of work. 
The proxies for average rent for existing housing services and the 
prices of other goods and services are fairly straightforward. The first is 
the consumer price index for shelter costs for the Pittsburgh area, lagged 
one month, while the second is the consumer price index for all items except 
shelter for that region.19 The proxy for the price of operating inputs is the 
consumer price index for home heating fuels and other utilities. Finally, the 
proxy for the price of maintenance is an index of residential construction 
costs. These indexes were also used as proxies for variables in the 
McKeesport and New Castle models. Although McKeesport and New Castle 
16 Pittsburgh operated two housing subsidy programs during the study period which 
provided mortgage assistance for purchasers of new homes. The dollar value of 
assistance for new construction under each of these programs was obtained from the 
Department of Housing, Urban Redevelopment Authority, City of Pittsbutgh. 
17 Data for the Pittsburgh metropolitan area were obtained from the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board. In this case, data for the Pittsburgh area are clearly applicable to 
McKeesport and New Castle, because most banks in the smaller cities are branches of 
Pittsburgh banks. 
18 These were obtained from the Office of Employment Security, Department of Labor 
and Industry, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
19 Except for the construction cost indexes (which were derived from Boeckh's Building 
Cost Index Nwnbers), the consumer price indexes were obtained from the CPI Detailed 
Report, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. Some 
interpolation and extrapolation was necessary because only bimonthly data are given for 
Pittsburgh, beginning with April 1978 (which can be calculated from the data published 
for June 1978). 
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are both near Pittsburgh (the former is a suburb, while the latter is outside 
the metropolitan boundaries), it is a rather bold assumption to suggest that 
indexes for the larger area are applicable to small communities in or near 
that area. fu lieu of better data, however, it is hoped that the Pittsburgh 
indexes generally reflect trends occurring in the smaller communities. 
The tax rates for Pittsburgh, McKeesport, and New Castle are shown 
in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The city, county, and school district all 
levy real estate taxes in Pittsburgh. Only the city, however, has a land value 
tax scheme, with heavier rates applicable to land. Since 1980, new 
residential improvements have been eligible for a three-year abatement of 
city, county, and school district improvement taxes. At first, use of the 
abatements was limited due to lack of knowledge about the abatement 
program. The number of abatements as a percentage of the number of 
building permits was quite low in 1980 (about 8 per cent) but has increased 
substantially since then (to approximately 75 per cent by 1983 [Department 
of City Pla1U1ing and Urban Redevelopment Authority 1985, Table A4]). fu 
order to take into account the abatements, the tax rates for 1980 and 
subsequent years have been adjusted.20 
For McKeesport and New Castle, it was also necessary to take into 
account county and school district rates as well as city rates. As in the case 
of Pittsburgh, the counties and school districts do not have land value tax 
systems. It was also necessary to take into account changes and differences 
in assessment ratios and tax abatements for improvements which went into 
effect in 1979 in McKeesport and 1982 in New Castle.21 
20 The procedure for making this adjustment was to treat the total structure tax rate as a 
perpetuity, calculate the present value of that perpetuity, and subtract from that the present 
value of a three-year annuity. The resulting value, expressed as a perpetuity, is the 
adjusted tax rate. In view of the initial lack of knowledge of the abatement program, the 
three-year annuities used in this calculation have been adjusted to reflect the level of 
participation in the program. This was accomplished by multiplying the values of the 
annuities by the percentage of participation. 
21 The abatements were taken into account in much the same manner as for Pittsburgh. 
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Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Table 1 
Pittsburgh Real Estate Tax Rates, 1978-1984 
(percentages) 
Land Tax Rate 
9.9875 
14.5865 
17.75 
19.45 
19.8 
21.65 
22.05 
Structure Tax Rate 
7.5125 
7.3115 
7.523 
8.542 
7.896 
7.492 
7.816 
Sources: Pittsburgh City Treasurer's Office (city and school district rates) and County of 
Allegheny Deed Registry and Records Management Office (county rates). 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Table 2 
McKeesport Real Estate Tax Rates, 1978-1986 
(percentages) 
Land Tax Rate 
8.6875 
8.1865 
15.9 
17.9 
18.85 
19.05 
19.05 
20.25 
20.475 
Structure Tax Rate 
8.6875 
7.5772 
8.4026 
10.4026 
11.3526 
11.5526 
11.778 
12.1283 
12.3533 
Sources: City Treasurer's Office, City of McKeesport; Deed Registry and Records 
Management Office, County of Allegheny; and Business Office, McKeesport Area School 
District 
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Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Table 3 
New Castle Real Estate Tax Rates, 1979-1986 
(percentages) 
Land Tax Rate 
5.446 
5.778 
6.586 
8.14 
7.87 
8.82 
11.49 
11.97 
Structure Tax Rate 
5.446 
5.778 
6.586 
5.853 
5.583 
5.9584 
6.2878 
6.8016 
Sources : City Treasurer's Office, City of New Castle; County Treasurer's Office, 
County of Lawrence; and Business Office, New Castle School District. 
Expected Signs of Coefficients 
As existing housing is a substitute for new housing, the coefficient of 
Re should be positive. If new housing is a normal good, an increase in 
resident employment should result in an increase in the demand for new 
housing. Thus the coefficient of M should be positive. Since other goods 
are substitutes for new housing, the coefficient of P x should be positive. 
Increases in the 'real spread' reflect increases in the relative cost of housing 
capital and, therefore, the coefficient of r should be negative. On the other 
hand, in the Pittsburgh model, the coefficient of s should be positive 
because mortgage subsidies reduce the cost of capital. Assuming that 
increases in the prices of operating and maintenance inputs will increase the 
cost of producing new housing, the quantity of new housing produced 
should fall. This implies that the coefficients of P 0 and Pm should be 
negative. The coefficient of G, in the Pittsburgh model, should be negative 
to the extent that rehabilitation projects represent a diversion of capital 
from new construction to rehabilitation. The coefficient of b, the tax rate 
applied to land, should be positive or zero for the reasons given previously. 
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The coefficient of z, the tax rate applied to improvements, should be 
positive for Pittsburgh, zero for McKeesport, and for New Castle it should 
be somewhere between the values for the other two cities. 
V. RESULTS 
Pittsburgh 
The empirical results for Pittsburgh are as follows:22 
ln Q = -0.20 + 0.89 In Re+ 1.12 lnM + 3.33 ln Px - 0.73 ln P0 
(0.99) (1.54) (2.12)* (2.69)** (1.19) 
- 5.10 In Pm - 0.003 In G + 0.04 In r + 0.24 Jn s- 0.41 In b 
(8.23)** (0.29) (1.74) (5.37)** (1.76) 
- 2.31Jnz+0.70 D 
(4.29)** (13.86)** 
where the absolute values of the !-statistics are given in parentheses and the 
estimates marked by * and ** are significantly different from zero at the 
five and one per cent levels, respectively. The high R2 value of 0.98 
indicates that virtually all of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variables. All of the coefficients have the 
expected signs except for the coefficients of the land tax rate and the real 
spread. Neither of those coefficients is significantly different from zero, 
however.23 
22 Initial estimation of the model indicated a need to adjust for autocorrelation. This was 
accomplished using the first difference method, with p based on the Durbin-Watson d-
statistic. In addition, it became evident that there was a need for a dummy variable, D, to 
capture the effect of an anomalous project that was distorting the Pittsburgh data. 
23 The general model proved to be very robust, as these basic results remained the same 
despite the various refinements which led up to the specific model for which estimates are 
shown. 
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The results show that changes in the land tax rate did not have a 
significant effect on the amount of housing development in Pittsburgh 
during the period of study. In contrast, the improvement tax rate is a highly 
significant determinant of the amount of new housing construction in 
Pittsburgh. Since the coefficients in the log-linear model are elasticities, a 1 
per cent decrease in the improvement tax rate should result in a 2.31 per 
cent increase in the dollar value of new housing. This implies that a 5 
per cent decrease in the improvement tax rate, such as that which occurred 
at the beginning of 1983, resulted in about an 11.6 per cent increase in the 
dollar value of new housing construction. Given the mean monthly amount 
of new housing construction during the study period ($1,076,042), this 
would represent an increase in construction activity of about $125,000 each 
month (in January 1978 dollars). 
An increase in the dollar value of housing construction could reflect an 
increase in the number of new units, an increase in their average cost, or 
both phenomena. Estimating the model with a measure of the number of 
new units as the dependent variable yields an elasticity estimate of -2.62 for 
the improvement tax rate variable. Again, the estimated coefficient of the 
land tax rate is not significantly different from zero while that of the 
improvement tax rate is. Given the mean monthly number of new housing 
units during the study period (about 32.7), a 5 per cent decrease in the 
improvement tax rate would have resulted in about 4.3 additional units each 
month-a 13.1 per cent increase. Estimating the model with a measure of 
the average cost of new units as the dependent variable yields estimated 
coefficients for the improvement and land tax rates that are not significantly 
different from zero. 
McKeesport and New Castle 
The empirical results for McKeesport are as follows: 
In Q = -0.02 - 0.17 In Re+ 0.39 In M + 2.44 In Px - 0.25 In P0 
(1.11) (0.30) (1.20) (2.28)* (0.31) 
-2.17 lnPm+0.001 lnr+0.03 Inb+0.05 lnz 
(2.80)** (0.05) (0.30) (0.21) 
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where the absolute values of the t-statistics and the significances are given as 
before. In this case, only the coefficients for the prices of other goods and 
services and the price of maintenance inputs are significantly different from 
zero at the usual levels of significance. Both coefficients have the expected 
signs. Neither of the tax rate coefficients is significantly different from 
zero. 
Similar results were obtained for New Castle: 
In Q = -0.05 + 0.02 In Re+ 0.06 In M + 2.30 In Px - 0.28 In P 0 
(4.46)**(0.14) (0.25) (2.95)** (0.41) 
- 0.52 In Pm - 0.01 ln r - 0.03 In b + 0.10 In z 
(0.72) (1.15) (0.25) (0.53) 
where only the coefficient for the prices of other goods and services is 
significantly different from zero at the usual levels (it also has the expected 
sign). Again, neither of the tax rate coefficients is significantly different 
from zero. Both the McKeesport and New Castle estimations yielded high 
coefficients of determination-0.98 and 0.99, respectively. This fact, 
coupled with the low /-statistics for most of the variables, suggests that there 
is a problem with multicollinearity in the data for both cities. In other 
words, the estimation procedure is unable to determine which independent 
variables are actually having an influence on the dependent variable in each 
case. This is a rather intractable problem24 which at best has the advantage 
of ensuring conservative conclusions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The results· are consistent with theoretical expectations. The tax on 
improvements has a significant excise effect in Pittsburgh, a central city, but 
24 The commonly-cited solution of removing independent variables is unsatisfactory 
because it is likely to result in specification error. As Gujarati (1978, p. 186) notes: 
"[T]he remedy may be worse than the disease in some situations because while 
multicollinearity may prevent effective estimation of the parameters of the model, omitting 
a variable may seriously mislead us as to the true values of the parameters". 
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no detectable effect in McKeesport, a suburban city. Changes in the tax on 
improvements had no discernible effect in New Castle, a result which is 
consistent with the idea that the incentive effect would be less significant in a 
relatively isolated city than in a central city. The Pittsburgh results also 
showed that decreases in the improvement tax rate encouraged housing 
development in Pittsburgh in the form of additional units rather than in the 
form of increases in the average cost (quality) of new units. This is 
consistent with Mieszkowski's suggestion that changes in property tax rates 
should lead to shifts in the location of households. Changes in the tax on 
land had no significant effect in any of the three cities, suggesting that the 
impediments to development which could be offset by the liquidity effect 
were insignificant. 
Given the results of this study, land value taxation seems to be a 
desirable strategy for central cities to employ in seeking to encourage 
development and attract households. Because households are relatively 
mobile within metropolitan areas, land value taxation may permit central 
cities to attract households that would otherwise locate in nearby suburban 
jurisdictions. 
The results of this study should not be taken to imply that land value 
taxation is not or could not be a useful tool for cities such as McKeesport or 
New Castle.25 As was mentioned, land value taxation may have different 
effects on different classes of property, and it is possible that studies of 
commercial or industrial properties in those places would yield positive 
results. Also, the various data problems-particularly the problem of 
multicollinearity-may have led to excessively conservative conclusions 
with respect to residential development. In addition, it is possible that 
changes in public expenditures offset the tax rate changes and skewed the 
results. Finally, as is true for the incentive effect, the liquidity effect may 
be significant for some classes of property but not for others or in some 
places and times but not others. This also suggests that it may not be valid to 
generalise from the results presented here. 
25 It should also be noted that land value taxation may be desirable purely on equity 
grounds. See, for example, the argument put forth by George (1954, pp. 333-346). 
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